Week's sad news

In the  quest to understand just how much the administrative state is harming economic activity, there are lots of anecdotes but few overall measures. But we have lots of anectdotes. I thought it would be fun to put together a week's worth from my morning-coffee WSJ reading.

Tuesday: The Labor Department issues a new "persuader rule"

...an employer would likely have to report asking a consultant to study the labor savings of moving to a right-to-work state. An attorney would have to disclose private discussions with an employer over a neutrality agreement to support a union’s organizing campaign...an attorney who advises Employer A about a union organizing campaign will also have to report if he’s conducting, say, a sexual harassment investigation at Employer B. All of this information will be public....The Manhattan Institute estimates the rule will cost about $60 billion over 10 years....The beneficiaries will be unions, which don’t have to report their own persuader activities. 

Wednesday: Judge blocks Staples Merger, and 45 federal programs,

U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan sided with the Federal Trade Commission, which in a December lawsuit alleged the combination of the office superstores would lead to higher prices for large corporations that buy office supplies in bulk.

Shares of both companies plunged in morning trading in New York. Office Depot stock dropped 37% to $3.82, while Staples fell 19% to $8.41...Staples said Tuesday it will cut another $300 million in annual costs and explore alternatives for its European operations, which include more than 200 stores.

Many of us remember the econ 101 fable of monopoly which needs government protection. Most of the academic IO and antitrust literature has come to disbelieve this classic story. Staples and Office Depot themselves are recent innovations. There is no distinct market for large box office retail stores. Everything in them can be bought elsewhere, and it's pretty easy to enter. In fact, they are in decline facing competition from the internet and other retailers. The idea that they can lock up the market on paper, toner cartriges, off-brand pcs, and raise prices is pretty silly. Especially for "large corporations that buy office supplies in bulk." Please, the point of the federal government is to preserve low prices for "large corporations" to buy paper?

Thursday's editorial on the matter puts it better than I did,

Stuck in a declining market, Staples and Office Depot have been reporting reduced sales. Government lawyers might have noticed that people are using less paper and ink these days. Then there are those little competitors called Amazon, Costco and Wal-Mart. Such competition is why the government couldn’t argue with a straight face that a merged company would force higher prices on individual consumers or small businesses. So the government claimed that the victims of the proposed merger would be huge corporations that buy in bulk...the judge made clear that he thinks the Exxons of the country need government help to get a deal on Post-it notes.  

Also, on the editorial page, 

The auditors at the Government Accountability Office report that there are currently 45 federal programs dedicated to supporting care “from birth through age five,” spread across multiple agencies. The Agriculture Department runs a nursery division, for some reason.

“Administering similar programs in different agencies can create an environment in which programs may not serve children and families as efficiently and effectively as possible,” GAO dryly notes. Parents can also claim five separate child-care tax credits.

Thurdsay A Climate Courtroom Crusade Scorches Due Process.

Read the whole thing, if like me you're not a lawyer. It turns out, back in the day, Attorneys general couldn't, on their own, subpoena all your files, comb through them, and then use the results to file criminal charges.

Mr. Schneiderman and other attorneys general have the power to bring not simply administrative, but criminal, charges on the basis of the information they force out of private parties. They thereby dangerously combine the roles of grand jury and prosecutor.

File it under decline of rule of law, and increasing ability of political officials to silence opponents.

In more classic gumming-up-the-works, Port-Trucking Firms Run Into Labor Dispute.

The nation’s busiest ports are emerging as a key battleground in the legal fight over whether truck drivers should be counted as employees or independent contractors.

Several trucking companies operating at the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles have filed for bankruptcy protection in recent months, citing mounting costs to settle hundreds of legal claims. 

This is related to the big fight whether Uber drivers are contractors or employees. Independent contractors -- as chosen by the companies and their drivers -- gives us the consumer cheaper services, and allows more freedom to the company and workers. Employee status costs a lot more, makes a few drivers better off, and keeps a lot of potential drivers out of the market.

Friday Tesla Can Build All The Cars It Wants. The Real Challenge Could Be Selling Them

Via Forbes, and a good reminder that so much damaging regulation is state and local. Tesla wants to sell you cars directly, no-haggle, the way you buy computers.

Tesla is prohibited from selling cars directly to consumers in many states, including Texas and Michigan, where laws protect franchised car dealers....its direct-to-consumer sales model has run into a buzz saw of state franchise laws..... In a few states, such as New Jersey, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania, Tesla won permission to operate a handful of retail locations, and no more. But dealer trade groups are objecting. In some states, they’ve filed suit to block retail licenses granted to Tesla; in others, they’ve proposed legislation that would prevent Tesla from obtaining such licenses.

Growth Interview

I did a short interview with the WSJ's Mary Kissel about my growth oped. If you can't see the embed above, try this direct link or this one. 

WSJ Growth Oped

I did an oped on growth in the Wall Street Journal, titled "Ending America’s Slow-Growth Tailspin." I'll post the full thing here in 30 days.

Blog readers will recognize a distilled version of my longer essay on growth (blog post here, html here,   pdf here), and the graph from Smith v. Jones blog post. I think out loud. The growth essay is much more detailed on diagnosis and especially on policy.

There are three basic ideas (two too many for a good oped).

1) Growth is everything. Increasing growth will do way more for every problem you can name than anything else on the economic agenda. Even if workers in 1910 could have taken all of Rockefeller's wealth, they would have been disastrously poor compared to today.

2) Can policies actually improve growth? The tut-tutters mocked Jeb Bush's 4% aspiration. I outline the "we've run out of ideas" school of thought, most recently in Bob Gordon's thoughtful book; the "everything is right but the zero bound" secular-staglation school, and the view that the growth giant is being held back by a liliputian army of politicized regulators.

As evidence,  I improved on the graph from an earlier post of the World Bank's ease of doing business score vs. GDP per capita,

(if you can't see the graph, click here)

This graph adds a few things relative to the one in WSJ. I added some outliers. Libya and Venzuela seem like countries with good reasons to have temporarily more GDP than their institutions can long support, Rwanda and Georgia the opposite. So the correlation is even better than it looks. Given how crude the world bank measure is, it's surprising it works so well. It's mostly about the difficulties of starting small businesses. I added Greece too to gives some sense of variation within the Euro-US world.

The point: Bad policies can do dramatic harm. Ipso facto, good policies must be able to do a lot of good. The US is not perfect!

A famous economist challenged my view that regulation is causing a lot of problems, noting that all of the big business types he talks to don't complain that much. But I think that's a horrendous selection bias. If you talk to the people still in business, you are talking to the ones that have figured out the political and regulatory game. Go talk to the ones whose businesses are closed, or not even started.

Another point, regulation has been getting worse for decades. Why the slump now? I think that a lot of the government onslaught's effect has been to make the economy less resilient. For example, social security disability is not a problem as long as you have a job. When you lose a job, and go on disability, now the huge disincentive to work, study, move, kicks in.  Recovering from a recession needs new jobs, new businesses, new innovations.

3) A very brief outline of policies to get growth going again. I think the key is to move past the standard rhetoric that defines our current partisan bickering. It's not how much we spend, really, it's how we spend it. Free market economics is not "trickle-down" economics, it's about incentives, simplicity, rule of law, and so forth.

Equity-financed banking

My dream of equity-financed banking may be coming true under our noses. In "the Uberization of banking" Andy Kessler at the WSJ reports on SoFi, a "fintech" company. The article is mostly about the human-interest story of its co-founder Mike Cagney. But the interspersed economics are interesting.

SoFi started by making student loans to Stanford MBAs, after figuring out that the default rate on such loans is basically zero. It

has since expanded to student loans more generally and added mortgages, personal loans and wealth management. Mr. Cagney says SoFi has done 150,000 loans totaling $10 billion and is currently at a $1 billion monthly loan-origination rate. 

Where does the money come from?

SoFi doesn’t take deposits, so it’s FDIC-free. ... Instead, SoFi raises money for its loans, most recently $1 billion from SoftBank and the hedge fund Third Point, in exchange for about a quarter of the company. SoFi uses this expanded balance sheet to make loans and then securitize many of them to sell them off to investors so it can make more loans

Just to bash the point home, consider what this means:

• A "bank" (in the economic, not legal sense) can finance loans, raising money essentially all from equity and no conventional debt. And it can offer competitive borrowing rates -- the supposedly too-high "cost of equity" is illusory.
   
• There is no necessary link between the business of taking and servicing deposits and that of making loans. Banks need not (try to) "transform" maturity or risk.
   
• To the extent that the bank wants to boost up the risk and return of its equity, it can do so by securitizing loans rather than by borrowing. (Securitized loans are not leverage -- there is no promise of your money back when you want it. Investors bear any losses immediately and without recourse.)
   
• Equity-financed banking can emerge without new regulations, or a big new Policy Initiative.  It's enough to have relief from old regulations ("FDIC-free").
   
• Since it makes no fixed-value promises, this structure is essentially run free and can't cause or contribute to a financial crisis. 

More. SoFi does not use the standard methods of evaluating credit risk:

Instead of relying on notoriously inaccurate backward-looking FICO scores, SoFi is “forward-looking.” That means asking basic questions—“Do you make more money than you spend?”—and calibrating where applicants went to college, how long they’ve been employed, how stable their income is likely to be over time.

Why can’t banks do this? Because if you use depositor money for loans, as all banks do, you fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and the Community Reinvestment Act,...

And Basel and the FSOC and the Fed and so forth. FICO score based mechanical lending standards are also demanded by government-backed securitizers Fannie and Freddie.

Yes, bank "safety" regulations demand that banks purposely lend to people that one can pretty clearly see will not pay it back, and demand that they do not lend money to people that one can pretty clearly see will pay it back.

Now, what will the regulatory response be to this sort of innovation? The right answer, of course, should be hosannas: You have introduced run-free banking, that solves all the financial-crisis worries that 90 years of bank regulation could not solve. Let this spread, and the army of bank regulators, lobbyists, lawyers, and associated politicians can all go, well, drive for Uber.

Somehow I doubt that will be the response from foresaid army. And SoFi might well want to invest in its own lawyers, lobbyists and politicians in today's America.

Rather than by the FDIC, SoFi is monitored by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The overbearing regulator that was Elizabeth Warren’s brainchild thus far hasn’t come down on SoFi—the CFPB is perhaps too preoccupied with using “disparate impact” analysis of old-school auto-loan businesses to focus on a relatively exotic, app-based form of banking. But Mr. Cagney should watch his back.

Indeed he should. In today's rather rule-free environment, the CFPB -- or Department of Justice -- might just discover it doesn't like the demographics of Stanford MBAs as target borrowers.

He’d like to get a national lending license, but that would entail federal-oversight entanglements he’d rather avoid.

If he can.

A little puzzle crops up at the end. For now, I gather SoFi does not issue public equity. The plan for expansion is

insurance companies and sovereign-wealth funds might rent him their balance sheets. 

I'm not sure what "rent a balance sheet" means, but it sounds a lot like private equity or long term debt.  It would be even better for stability and low cost to issue public equity, which is liquid -- investors who need money fast can sell. But public equity comes with its own regulatory scrutiny, and perhaps even that is too much for innovation these days.

Kashkari on TBTF

Neel Kashkari, the new president of the Minneapolis Fed, is making a splash with a speech about too big to fail, and the need for a deeper and more fundamental reform than Dodd Frank.  I am delighted to hear a Federal Reserve official offering, in public, some of the kinds of thoughts that I and like-minded radicals have been offering for the last few years.

I believe the biggest banks are still too big to fail and continue to pose a significant, ongoing risk to our economy.

Now is the right time for Congress to consider going further than Dodd-Frank with bold, transformational solutions to solve this problem once and for all.

From an economic point of view, now is indeed the right time -- calm before the storm. I'm not so sure now is a great time from a political view! But perhaps anti-Wall Street feelings from both parties can be harnessed to good use.

...When the technology bubble burst in 2000, it was very painful for Silicon Valley and for technology investors, but it did not represent a systemic risk to our economy. Large banks must similarly be able to make mistakes—even very big mistakes—without requiring taxpayer bailouts and without triggering widespread economic damage.

This is a key lesson. As Dodd-Frank spreads to insurance companies, equity mutual funds, and asset managers, we're losing sight of the idea that trying to stop anyone from ever losing money again is not a wise way to prevent a panic. It's the nature of bank liabilities, not their assets, that is the problem.

I learned in the crisis that determining which firms are systemically important—which are TBTF—depends on economic and financial conditions. In a strong, stable economy, the failure of a given bank might not be systemic. The economy and financial firms and markets might be able to withstand a shock from such a failure without much harm to other institutions or to families and businesses. But in a weak economy with skittish markets, policymakers will be very worried about such a bank failure.

In other words, the whole idea of designating an institution that is per se "systemic" is silly.

...there is no simple formula that defines what is systemic. I wish there were. It requires judgment from policymakers to assess conditions at the time.

Here I think Kashkari isn't really learning the lesson. If it's undefinable, even in words, and needs "judgment," then perhaps the idea really is empty.

More deeply, I think we need to apply much the same thinking to regulation that we do to monetary policy. At least in principle, most analysts think some sort of rule is a good idea for monetary policy. Pure discretion leads to volatility, moral hazard, time-inconsistency and so on. We should start talking about good rules for financial crisis management, not just ever greater power and discretion to follow whatever the "judgment" (whim?) of the moment says.

A second lesson for me from the 2008 crisis is that almost by definition, we won’t see the next crisis coming, and it won’t look like what we might be expecting. If we, or markets, recognized an imbalance in the economy, market participants would likely take action to protect themselves. When I first went to Treasury in 2006, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson directed his staff to work with financial regulators at the Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission to look for what might trigger the next crisis... We looked at a number of scenarios, including an individual large bank running into trouble or a hedge fund suffering large losses, among others. We didn’t consider a nationwide housing downturn. It seems so obvious now, but we didn’t see it, and we were looking. We must assume that policymakers will not foresee future crises, either.

This is an unusual and worthy expression of humility. Others advocate loading up the Fed with "macroprudential" regulation and "bubble pricking" tools, on the faith that this time, yes this time, they really will see it coming, and really will do something about it.  Regulators are not wiser, smarter, less behavioral, etc. than traders.

Speaking of the "resolution authority,"

Unfortunately, I am far more skeptical that these tools will be useful to policymakers in the second scenario of a stressed economic environment. Given the massive externalities on Main Street of large bank failures in terms of lost jobs, lost income and lost wealth, no rational policymaker would risk restructuring large firms and forcing losses on creditors and counterparties using the new tools in a risky environment, let alone in a crisis environment like we experienced in 2008. They will be forced to bail out failing institutions—as we were. We were even forced to support large bank mergers, which helped stabilize the immediate crisis, but that we knew would make TBTF worse in the long term.

There are no atheists in foxholes, the saying goes.  Notice "forcing losses on creditors and counterparties." This is exactly right. "Bailouts" are not about saving the institution, they are about saving its creditors. We should always call them "creditor bailouts." And a run is in full swing, and when the hotlines to the Treasury are buzzing "if we lose money on this, then the world will end," anyone in charge will guarantee the debts.

I believe we must begin this work now and give serious consideration to a range of options, including the following:

• Breaking up large banks into smaller, less connected, less important entities.

Here, Kashkari caused a stir in the press. Bernie Sanders voiced approval. Since "breaking up" has no subject -- who is to do this and how? -- and no mechanism, I'll give Kashkari the benefit of the doubt that he had something more sophisticated in mind than brute force.

• Turning large banks into public utilities by forcing them to hold so much capital that they virtually can’t fail (with regulation akin to that of a nuclear power plant).

Aha! My favorite simple solution, more capital!  I'm delighted to hear it. Of course (to whine a bit), banks don't "hold" capital, they "issue" capital -- it's a liability not an asset. And if they have so much capital that they virtually can't fail, what is this business about public utilities? And why in the world do they need regulation akin to that of a nuclear power plant? Given how regulation has spiraled costs, stultified innovation, and stopped expansion of the one scalable carbon-free energy source we have, that's a particularly unfortunate analogy. Or maybe it's an incredibly accurate analogy for just where Dodd-Frank style regulation will lead. The point is the opposite: with "so much capital that they virtually can't fail" they don't need the hopeless project of "systemic" designation, intensive asset risk regulation, and so forth.

• Taxing leverage throughout the financial system to reduce systemic risks wherever they lie.

A Pigouvian tax on short term debt -- after we get rid of all the subsidies for it -- is my other favorite answer.

The financial sector has lobbied hard to preserve its current structure and thrown up endless objections to fundamental change.

Many of the arguments against adoption of a more transformational solution to the problem of TBTF are that the societal benefits of such financial giants somehow justify the exposure to another financial crisis. I find such arguments unpersuasive.

This needs some explanation. Banks produce studies claiming that higher capital requirements or reduced amounts of run-prone short-term funding will cause them to charge more for loans and reduce economic growth. Kashkari is pointing out that these arguments are pretty thin, because the cost of not doing it is immense -- 10 percent or so of GDP lost for nearly a decade and counting is plausible.

Obviously, I don't agree with everything in the speech. Kashkari is a bit too vague about "contagion" "linkages" and so fort for my taste. But the good news is to have this conversation, and not settle in to implementing page 35,427 of Dodd Frank regulations, head in the sand, while we wait for the next crisis.

The rest of the speech outlines his plans to get the Minneapolis Fed working hard on these issues, and to push for them at the larger Fed. This is a project worth watching.

In case I haven't plugged it about 10 times, my agenda for these issues is in Toward a Run-Free Financial System and the many blog posts under the "banking" "financial reform" and "regulation" labels.